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This is a book on the problematics of com
parison between huma~ beings and other animals.
To effect this comparison, Midgley argues that
philosophy must gain access to certain develop
ments in contemporary science, notably eth
ology. There are risks attl3ndant in construct
ing this road between philosophy and a natural
science. Hidgley would avoid the threat,
posed by I·Jilson in Sociobiology: The Ne~
Synthesis, that a neurobiology eventuaIry
could bypass, by itself replacing, moral
philosophy. More generally, she eschews the
more obvious pitfalls of scientism and
physicalism by finding a middle road between
them and an existentialist thought, (to which
she attributes, somewhat facilely and inaccu
rately, a concept of absolutized freedom).
One potential gain in this project is a more
informed philosophy that would desist fro~
dividing the hUl'an being within itself and
from other nonh~~an beings. It would no
longer fall prey to the over-simplifications
of certain myths and metaphors about nonhuman
animals: the animal automaton over against
the person as soul or rationality housed in
a body; or the "beast in man", nan's bru
tality founded in his remnant animality.
Since the route must cut through an ex
ceedingly dense conceptu,l thicket, Midgley,
understandably, can only )ffer a preliminary
clearin~ and direction for it.
Positing that
the spe~ies human animal has a "nature", she
gives considerable weight in its description
to a concept of motive. By this she refers
to a complex, evolved, genetically given
"pattern of living", a structure consisting
of general "active and social tendencies",
and, on an individual or lived level, of
certain "aims." i,fith this kind of definition
of a human species, she can indicate (1)
how rationality, language, and culture, the

3
traditional cleavers, are, rather, continuous
with, being outgrowths of, the peculiar but
general human way of living; how, for example,
rationality is grounded in a sociality shared
with other animals; and (2) how, then, the
relation of humans to other animals, the
latter consisting in variant structures of
motives, is one of kinship and complex
species-distinct affinities. There is con
tinuity among species, making rich, produc
tive, and non-dichotomous comparisons possi
ble because our nature, in common with theirs,
is a "certain range of powers and tendencies."
The otherness of the other is not radical.
Even a distinction between higher and lower
beings, the metaphor of height applied to
evolution, Midgley finds unintelligible in
that adaptation is relative and contingent.
Largely implicitly, the book lays a foun
dation for such considerations as the ethical
status of nonhumans. If ethics is the pri
oritizing of competing claims through reflec
tion, human claims must derive from what is
important to us. This necessarily issues
from the structure of our motives. But
these motives, in turn, point to "our kin
ship with the rest of the biosphere." That
kinship is not only historical, as animals
are part of the context of our world; it is
structural--our being is continuous with
that of other animals. Like us, the indi
vidual nonhuman animal is an end in itself,
Midgley here extending Kant; like us, he is
both an object and a subject; he is a per
son, in that he maintains particular signif
icant relations; he has purposes, priorities
and claims that issue from his own inte
grated pattern of motives.
I~ile these last critical assertions about
animals follow from the analysis of motive,
in this work there is not room to fully argue
and unpa~ them. Hu lever, Midgley does pro
vide a consistent, c!~arly developed, and
well-grounded justification for the require
ment that we take nonhuman animals into
account. We must do so not only to under
stand ourselves, but, the work suggests,
to solve our own conflicts of interests.
Her analysis gives a fuller meaning to
the sense in which human ethics necessarily
include the interspecific. That other
animals also have claims is part of our
ethical dilemma.
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